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While there is extensive knowledge about how to design scal decentral-
ization policies, considerably less is understood about how a decentralization
program should be sequenced and implemented. Countries embarking on de-
centralization often struggle with decisions about the essential components of
decentralization including the order of an introduction of decentralization poli-
cies, the number of years necessary to bring a full program on line, and the
components of the transition strategy.
We argue that the sequencing of decentralization policies is an important
determinant of its success. The consequences of a poorly sequenced decentral-
ization program can range from minor delays and complications to ineective-
ness and subsequent failing support of decentralization eorts, macroeconomic
instability, and fundamental failure in public sector delivery. At a minimum,
the strategy of \making it up as we go" will not lead to the same structure of
decentralization as will a planned strategy.
The paper raises two questions: First, is there an optimal sequencing for
decentralization policies and implementation? Our answer is that there is, and
that following these sequencing rules can reduce the costs and risks of imple-
menting scal decentralization. Second, to what extent do countries follow
these optimal sequencing rules? The answer is, in general, they do not. The
gap between theory and practice is a result of the complexity of sequencing
design, which discourages scal planners from implement the full process. In
addition, sequencing requires a sustained discipline and vision for its imple-
menting, as well as overcoming pressures from political actors, especially in
developing countries.
* The authors are Professors of Economics, The Andrew Young School of Policy S-
tudies, Georgia State University. This paper was prepared for the World Bank's De-
centralization and Subnational Economics Thematic Group, with nancial support from
the Danish Trust Fund. Annexes are available on request from the authors. An earlier
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1. INTRODUCTION
While there is extensive knowledge about how to design scal decentral-
ization policies, considerably less is understood about how a decentraliza-
tion program should be sequenced and implemented.1 Countries embarking
on decentralization often struggle with decisions about its essential compo-
nents, the order of introduction of decentralization policies and activities,
the number of years necessary to implement a program fully, and the com-
ponents of the transition strategy. We argue in this paper that the sequenc-
ing of decentralization is an important determinant of its success. The con-
sequences of a poorly sequenced decentralization program can range from
minor delays and complications, to ineectiveness and subsequent failing
support of decentralization eorts, to macroeconomic instability, and even
to chaotic situations with failed public services.
Logically, and as experience shows, some decentralization measures (e.g.,
devolution of expenditure responsibilities) may not yield the desired decen-
tralization outcome without a previous complementary reform (e.g., provid-
ing for budget autonomy by eliminating mandates), or the eects may even
be pernicious (putting revenue decentralization ahead of decisions about
expenditure assignment). As we elaborate in this paper, there is ample
country evidence, accumulated over several decades that the sequencing of
decentralization does matter. At best, the argument that sequencing does
not matter may be correct only if one is willing to ignore the adjustmen-
t, friction and time costs that may be involved in getting to the \right"
decentralization outcome. At a minimum, the strategy of \making it up
as we go" will not lead to the same structure of decentralization as will a
planned strategy.
If sequencing matters, what is the best way to proceed? There are two
ways to develop guidelines for sequencing decentralization. One is to oer
a normative approach, i.e. in a world without political and administra-
tive constraints, what is the best way to bring a decentralization strategy
on line? We propose such an approach in the next section of this paper.
The other approach is to distill real-world lessons about sequencing decen-
tralization by studying the practice, which reects the political economy
issues that intervene in the process of designing and implementing a scal
decentralization program. In this paper, we consider the practice in some
detail in ve countries|Indonesia, India, Mexico, Russia, and Tanzania|
and comment on the experience in several others. These ve countries were
chosen for special attention because they represent various, ongoing decen-
version of this paper was presented at a half-day seminar April 25, 2005 during the
World Bank's Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Learning Week.
1A few papers have addressed this question. See for example, Spahn (2005) and
GTZ/CONAM (2002).
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tralization processes around the world, and provide a good cross section of
sequencing experience. This international practice shows there is no sin-
gle best approach to sequencing scal decentralization and that that one
formula will not produce the same results in every country.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. A Normative Approach to Sequencing
Our version of the normative textbook approach to sequencing scal
decentralization has six steps, as outlined in Figure 1. This might be argued
to be a stylized approach to sequencing decentralization that might serve
as a reasonable baseline against which to compare the real world practice,
where politics and administrative constraints will certainly rule the day.
There should be a platform of enabling administrative and institutional
structures on which the decentralization can be built. One important pre-
condition for eective decentralization is the rule of law for the adjudication
of intergovernmental disputes or democratic electoral rules. This is criti-
cal given the divergent interests associated with decentralized governance.
Other preconditions include the existence of an orderly budget process and
scal rules. The platform might also include the deconcentration of cen-
tral government services to the regions. Deconcentration can speed up the
process of decentralization because there is already a local experience with
managing local service delivery. However, it does not fall into the category
of absolute requirements for beginning a decentralization program.
The actual scal decentralization process begins with a national debate
involving the key stakeholders (Step 1). This debate might be in the con-
text of a national election, sometimes responding to bottom-up demands
for local autonomy. Alternatively, it might be part of a discussion led by
an appointed national commission to consider a change in the pattern of
governance. Either way, a general consensus may be reached about the
sentiment for pushing ahead with decentralization and some clear \cham-
pions" of decentralization should emerge. This would seem necessary if the
decentralization program is to stay on track and be sustainable.
The second step is the design of the scal decentralization program, cul-
minating in a policy paper or a framework for the scal decentralization.
While the national consensus might be around the broad idea of moving
government closer to the people, the White Paper would lay out the govern-
ment's plan for accomplishing this. It would outline the main components
of the scal decentralization program, provide a timetable for implementa-
tion and serve as the basis for writing the law.
Step three is to draft and pass the decentralization law(s). This naturally
follows on from the national mandate and from the policy framework paper,
and it gives legal standing to the implementation of the scal decentraliza-
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FIG. 1. Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization: A Normative Approach
The Platform: Deconcentration, Rule of Law, etc.
Step 1: Carry out a National Debate on the 
Issues Related to Decentralization Policy
Step 2: Do the Policy Design and Develop a White Paper
Step 3: Pass the Decentralization Law
Step 4: Develop the Implementing Regulations
Step 5: Implement the Decentralization Program
Step 6: Monitor, Evaluate, and Retrofit
tion measures. The law must be clear and it must be true to the policy
design. The decentralization law might stand alone, or some elements of
the decentralization program might become part of the constitution.
Step four is to adopt a set of implementing regulations that spell out the
detail of how the scal decentralization will be put in place. For example,
the White Paper and the law might call for the transfer of civil servants
from central to subnational governments. The implementing regulations
on the other hand, would spell out the detail of this transfer. Essentially,
the implementing regulations are written for those government ocials|
central and local|who would put the new system in place.
Step ve is implementation, which involves a multitude of tasks. Follow-
ing a very clear set of rules and regulations, the central and subnational
governments begin assuming their new scal responsibilities and so on.
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Step six involves a well-designed and operational system of monitoring
and evaluation by the central (state) government and a well laid out ac-
countability system at the subnational level.
The steps outlined above might be thought of as a normative approach
to ordering the elements of a sustainable scal decentralization strategy.
This sequencing allows each step to build on the necessary prerequisites,
and therefore could minimize the chances for failure of the system to ac-
complish its objectives. In the real world, however, there are important
constraints that steer countries away from such an optimal sequencing.
And sometimes, these departures are in the best interests of getting the
job done. But clearly, while some departures may be admissible in terms
of the costs and disruption involved in the decentralization process (for ex-
ample, getting the implementation started without complete implementing
regulations), some other departures may be too costly (for example, decen-
tralizing borrowing powers without providing for a hard budget constraint
for subnational governments).
In what follows we elaborate on each of these six steps in an optimal
sequencing, provide more detail on what is entailed in each, examine the
potential costs of ignoring or mishandling each step, and consider how the
sequencing steps have been addressed in a number of countries that either
have already decentralized or are in the process of doing so. Our goals
are to develop amendments to the normative approach outlined in Figure
1, based on the international practice, to identify some of the reasons for
deviation, and to assess the risks that can come from making dierent
sequencing decisions.
2.2. Deconcentration before Decentralization?
A successful deconcentration of central government service delivery may
provide an important platform for implementing decentralization success-
fully. This platform might include a cadre of central (or state) ocers
involved in service delivery in the regions. When the decentralization pol-
icy is eventually crafted, the local civil service will be more ready to take
on the responsibilities assigned to the subnational level, and the risks of
extreme disruption of service delivery will be less. This appears to be a ma-
jor reason why Indonesia's \big bang" decentralization was accomplished
without a breakdown in public service delivery. On the other hand, the s-
low pace and reversals of decentralization policies in many Latin American
countries over the past several decades may be linked to initial conditions
that did not include deconcentration of public services.
However, one could also make the case, we believe a weaker one, that
deconcentration policies may retard the adoption of a scal decentralization
strategy. Bureaucrats in deconcentrated agencies may resist decentraliza-
tion to local governments, because they fear loss of their power base or even
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their job. Moreover, taking the deconcentration step may even reduce the
demand for strengthening local government nance by softening political
dissatisfaction with existing centralized policies.
3. THEORY AND PRACTICE
3.1. The National Debate about Fiscal Decentralization
The momentum for decentralization may originate from the bottom up,
as in Russia, Spain or Estonia, from the top down, as in Tanzania, Thai-
land or Bulgaria, or from both directions as in Mexico, India, or Indonesia.
Regardless of where the pressure originates, some form of national discus-
sion about the desirability of decentralization is an important rst step in
the process. The key political and administrative stakeholders and ulti-
mately the voters must buy into the desirability and general outlines of a
scal decentralization strategy. Otherwise, scal decentralization may not
be sustainable. This national discussion should be about the basic goals of
the decentralization program and the options that are available for struc-
turing decentralization, but should not dwell on the detail. The idea is to
get some general agreement on what scal decentralization should accom-
plish and on how it should change the way government does its business.
The national debate that took place in Canada during the last part of
the past century on federal-provincial scal relationships provides a good
example of this.
Ideally, this national debate will involve the main political parties, will
have some degree of formality (as in the case of a national commission),
and will be transparent (as in the case of a national election). If this is
not the rst step in the process, it almost certainly will take place later
and in that event could prove detrimental or perhaps even fatal to the
implementation of the program. A recent example is provided by Moldova
where in the past three years an incipient and promising decentralization
program got reversed and abandoned once the opposition party took power
in the national elections.
3.2. Reasons for Decentralization
Decentralization is usually introduced as a policy to oset a problem
that has caused dissatisfaction with the present centralized system of gov-
ernance. Identifying this underlying problem is a crucial step in designing
a program that will match up with the demands coming from those who
are calling for a change in the present system.
The identication of the underlying problem, however, depends very
much on whose vantage is taken. When viewed through the eyes of the
population in general, scal decentralization can become a high priority
policy issue because of dissatisfaction with the government performance.
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In a developing country, this often means that they are dissatised with
the quality of public services that they receive, with their lack of voice in
determining outcomes, and with the responsiveness and accountability of
government ocials. Another possibility is that signicant groups of vot-
ers feel unconnected to the present governance structure because they are
ethnically or culturally dierent. There may also be a general perception
of failure and resentment towards highly centralized models of governance,
such as Russia and other countries that are in transition from planned
socialism and absolutist regimes.
From the perspective of the central government political players and ad-
ministrative bureaucracy, however, the underlying rationale may be quite
dierent. Politicians may react opportunistically to a decentralization ini-
tiative and support improved citizen participation in governance to gather
more political favor, or to act strategically to appease centrifugal, or sepa-
ratist forces and hold the country together. All of this rhetoric needs to be
part of the national discussion because it calls out the relationship between
the underlying problems as seen by the population and the policy direction
being advocated by government leaders.
The main point in this discussion is that the design of the decentraliza-
tion program and the sequencing of decentralization policies must follow
identication of the primary objectives of the decentralization. The or-
der in which decentralization policies should be introduced in a program
driven by one objective may be very dierent from the best sequencing for
a program driven by another primary goal. A national discussion of the
reasons for decentralization would seem an absolutely essential rst step.
Moreover, only by knowing the primary objectives of the program can one
evaluate the success of the decentralization strategy. However, identifying
the primary objectives of the decentralization may not be an easy task. The
objectives that most drive the decentralization strategy can be wrapped in
a heavy load of many other contemporary issues. This is well illustrated in
the ve countries of our focus. (See also the summary in row 1 of Table 1.)
There are some common threads in the rationale for scal decentral-
ization in the Indonesian and Russian cases. The celebrated Indonesian
\big-bang" decentralization in 2001 was a long-in-the-making policy reform
that was driven by a perceived over-centralization of government decision-
making and a perceived exploitation of some regions by a very strong and
allegedly corrupt Suharto regime.2 Independence movements and centrifu-
gal forces in many of the regions in the Russian periphery, especially those
with heavy ethnic populations, in combination with a weak center in the
midst of a power struggle between President Yeltsin and a communist dom-
2Two very good discussions of the origins of the Indonesian decentralization program
are Rasyid (2004) and Hofman and Kaiser (2004).
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inated parliament, seemed to call for a decentralization program with heavy
emphasis on local political control and expenditure autonomy.
Mexico's decentralization was also a reaction to a longstanding percep-
tion of too much central control. In 2004, a National Finance Convention
was convened with the objective of developing a national consensus on the
direction of future decentralization reforms in Mexico.3 The impetus for the
new drive for decentralization in Mexico has enhanced political competi-
tion and demands for greater political decentralization and administrative
eciency. The current policy design of scal federalism emphasizes ex-
penditure autonomy and local political control and control over the civil
service.
Tanzania's decentralization is being driven more by dissatisfaction with
the quality of local public services, which has been attributed to too lit-
tle expenditure discretion at the local government level. India is likewise
attempting to address a problem of too little discretion at the local govern-
ment level, as well as a problem of scal indiscipline at the state government
level.
3.3. Who Should Participate in the National Discussion?
A national debate about the merits of scal decentralization ideally
would involve all relevant interest groups, i.e., all of those who see po-
tential benets or costs from a move toward scal decentralization. The
discussion will be led by the central government, which ultimately will make
the rules of any new decentralization. But the discussion must be inclu-
sive. A basic idea behind decentralization is to empower those at the state
and local government level by making them part of the decision-making
process. It would be self-defeating to leave them out of the debate. The
ip side of this is that much of the central bureaucracy will lose power
with decentralization. It would be equally foolish to leave them out of the
debate. The goal is to develop as much of a consensus as is possible and
to forestall later criticism that the process was not transparent.
But there are important tradeos involved. The broader the audience in
the national debate, the harder it will be to gain consensus for a program.
The result may be a prolonged discussion that nally dies of inertia, or a
watered-down program that may not address the underlying problems.
The national debate may be spontaneous, as it was in Indonesia, and
all parties can have voice. In other cases, the national discussion is more
formal and orchestrated from the top, as in the cases of Tanzania, China,
Bulgaria or Vietnam. It is not unusual for the national discussion about
decentralization to be the responsibility of a commission or even a Ministry.
In such cases, the discussion is led by the higher level government (central
3See the discussion in Webb and Gonzalez (2003) on the diculties and opportunities
Mexico faces in reaching a national consensus for future reforms.
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or state), as was the case in South Africa. It is a mistake, however, to
leave the decentralization discussion fully in the hands of the central (or
state) government.4 The result can be a struggle between central ministries
that would gain or lose inuence, with potentially little input from the
subnational governments, who are the key to making scal decentralization
succeed.
The Parliament or Legislature also should be part of the national discus-
sion. After the decentralization program is underway, Parliament will be
the body that passes or repeals the legislation that supports or defeats the
intent of the decentralization program. In fact, if the general framework
for decentralization is not in place at the time of implementation, Parlia-
ment may well become a principal inuence on the shape of the program.
This is all the more reason to have Parliament or Congress heavily involved
in the initial national debate. However, Parliament alone cannot lead the
national discussion because its members may be too politically driven and
power is often too unequally divided. Parliament was not a key player in
the national debate over decentralization in Indonesia. However, shortly
after the program was conceived, Parliament became a principal inuence
on shaping the decentralization program in its rst years.
Parliament in Tanzania played only a minor role. One of the reasons for
the introduction of a formula-based transfer system appears to have been
that the MOF was tired of being unable to explain to MPs the criteria for
distribution of revenues among local governments.
The involvement of subnational governments in the national debate is
not easily accomplished because often this sector is not represented in an
organized way. Associations of local governments, or of mayors, or gov-
ernors, should be given voice in the national discussion. For example, in
Mexico, the National Conference of Governors (Conago) has emerged as a
powerful counterpart to the federal government. However, because their
interests diverge (e.g., richer vs. poorer regions, or urban vs. rural local
governments), their formal representation may be splintered. In Russia in
the mid 1990s, an association representing a small number of the richer
regions lobbied the federal government, sometimes quite eectively, on a
variety of divisive issues, such as the overall level of interregional redistri-
bution and the sharing of revenues from natural resources. In contrast, the
Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania is very weak, and has little
impact on the reform process, although the urban areas do appear to have
some political power.
4A conspicuous example of this kind of mistake is to put the line ministries at the
central level in charge of dening decentralization in their respective sectors, such as has
been the case in El Salvador, Nicaragua and other Central America countries (see Arze
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2004).
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It is important that a central ministry not be taken to stand for the
interests of local governments. The Ministry of Local Government or Min-
istry of Home Aairs may be \closest" to the subnational governments on
a day-to-day basis, but in many cases are not strong proponents of signif-
icantly enhanced local scal autonomy. Their primary interest may well
be in the direction of not giving up control over the scal operations of
the local governments. Arguably, this has been the experience with the
Ministry of Home Aairs in Indonesia.
Civil society, unions, and representatives of the civil service may be im-
portant contributors to the development of a decentralization program.
Typically these groups do not nd a place at the table in the national
discussion, and when they do, their knowledge about the subject of decen-
tralization may be limited to a single issue of self-interest. For example,
national teacher and health professional unions have been a serious imped-
iment to the decentralization of education and health services in Mexico.
However, informal organizations and NGOs have become increasingly im-
portant in scal decentralization strategies in many countries and it would
be a mistake to ignore them in the national debate.
3.4. The Format for Discussion
In what format can the national discussion about decentralization take
place? Sometimes, the process itself can play a major role in shaping the
kind of decentralization that will be adopted.
The discussion might be prompted by external events and the national
debate might be organized as a result of these events. One possibility is
that it can be part of a political or economic upheaval, such as the end of
apartheid in South Africa or the breakup of the Soviet Union and regime
change in Central and Eastern Europe.5 In such cases, the national discus-
sion about decentralization can be especially reactionary to the unfairness
of the present system, and more prone to lead to an entirely new framework
than to adjust the present system. Indonesia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are
other cases in point.
In Tanzania, the latest wave of decentralization reforms got started with
a National Conference in 1996 under the banner of \Towards a Shared
Vision for Local Government in Tanzania." The results of the conference
were incorporated in a strategy document, The Local Government Reform
Agenda (LGRA), which in 1998 was endorsed by the Government.
In Indonesia, the process was simply commissioned. The Ministry of
Regional Autonomy (later merged into the Ministry of Home Aairs) was
commissioned to draw up the law describing the new assignment of ex-
penditure responsibly, the new civil services rules, and the nature of local
5See Bahl and Smoke (2003), Wallich (1994), and Bird, Ebel and Wallich (1995).
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government autonomy in matters of scal management. The Ministry of
Finance was commissioned to draft the law on the nancing of these local
governments including revisions to the system of intergovernmental scal
transfers.
A second way in which the decentralization discussion might be joined is
through the deliberations of an appointed commission. In this case, the re-
form program might be less comprehensive, especially if there is no national
imperative to make a sweeping change in the system of governance. This
has been the situation for over ve decades with India's Finance Commis-
sions.6 This has also been the case in Russia in the late 1990s when several
government commissions were created to suggest alternative paths to re-
forming equalization transfers and other aspects of the intergovernmental
nance system. More recently, President Putin appointed the Kozak com-
mission for the same purpose and the commission recommendations have
been highly inuential in the reform agenda of the Russian government.7
In Pakistan, the military government appointed the National Reconstruc-
tion Bureau (NRB) in 1999 and charged it with developing a decentraliza-
tion plan. Though inputs from all sectors were encouraged, the NRB had
a relatively free hand in developing the program. The appointed head of
the NRB was a retired general.
In other cases, the national discussion about decentralization may be
more conventional and may take place in the context of a regular national
or state election, as was the case in Mexico's presidential election of 2000.
3.5. The Champions
An important ingredient for the success of scal decentralization is a
coalition of strong advocates. These advocates, or champions, will keep
decentralization in the center of the national debate and will work to de-
velop the coalitions necessary to enact a decentralization policy.
But what if there are no decentralization champions? In theory, the
policy design may go on, but in practice what is likely to happen is that
the entire process will drag on for years with otherwise minor obstacles be-
coming insurmountable. The recent experiences of countries like Thailand
and Georgia show how the process of decentralization has failed to advance
because of a lack of strong champions. For this reason, it is important that
the champions become active in the very rst steps of the introduction of
a scal decentralization program.
6India has had twelve successive Finance Commissions with the main role of recom-
mending to Government on center-state revenue sharing and other nance issues. An
independent Finance Commission is mandated in the Constitution. See Singh (2004).
7See the discussion in Martinez-Vazquez, Timofeev and Boex (2005).
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4. POLICY DESIGN
4.1. The White Paper
Fiscal decentralization is a policy that is designed to achieve certain ob-
jectives. Therefore, it is critical that the objectives be clearly specied
before the program is designed. The overall framework for the decentral-
ization must be elaborated in a policy paper. This policy paper must be
specic enough, and comprehensive enough, to guide the development of
the law and the implementation. And, it must come after the national
discussion that gives the mandate for decentralization policy.
What if decentralization goes forward, but there is no such policy paper?
Two major problems are almost certain to occur.
First, without a roadmap for the decentralization strategy, governmen-
t and Parliament will \make it up as they go." This can lead to pieces
of the decentralization strategy that do not t together, e.g., starting the
process by decentralizing revenues before any clear assignment of expen-
diture functions, mandating an expenditure assignment list that does not
match revenues assigned, authorizing borrowing powers with no provision
for repayment capacity, building expectations of scal responsibility, but
making no provision for a hard budget constraint, or assuming that all
subnational governments will have the same capacity to implement decen-
tralization programs. Even with a White Paper in place, elected politicians
and bureaucrats who are new to the scene might introduce changes that
are contradictory and eventually harmful to the objectives of the decen-
tralization. Or, interest groups might prevail in getting policy adjusted to
satisfy their own objectives. But this will be much less likely to happen if
a framework is clearly in place.
The other problem with not having a documented framework is that lat-
er year policy changes may not be consistent with the overall goals for the
scal decentralization program. It is easier, for example, for Parliament
to pass a new decentralization measure and label it as \supportive of the
strategy," when the strategy has not been written down. An interesting
case in point is Indonesia, where a hold harmless system was put in place
by Parliament to protect local government from receiving any reductions in
revenues upon the introduction of the new, formula-based system of equal-
ization grants. This hold harmless provision minimized the equalization
eects of the new grant regime and helped perpetuate undesirable aspects
of the previous system (directly compensating local governments according
to the number of their employees.) This was not envisioned in the original
program design. Parliament, after year one of the decentralization pro-
gram, decided to keep this hold harmless system in place. With hindsight,
the problem was that there never was a rm plan as to how the new trans-
fer system would be phased in. Of course, Parliament may have overruled
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any rm plan in favor of its own program in any case, but the existence of
a policy paper would have made that more dicult.
The White Paper that frames the decentralization policy needs to cover
all of the elements of the program, but it need not cover them in a detail
that would be expected in the implementing regulations, nor should it
strive to impose a tight timetable where all reforms should happen at once.
However, it should be the result of a careful analysis of the options, it
should have beneted from review and input from a broad cross-section
of stakeholders, and it should propose a realistic timetable with a clear
and connected road map of the steps to be taken over the next several
years. The White Paper should be a published document in order to give
transparency to the process.
Common sense would seem to dictate the need for an overall framework
as an early step in implementing decentralization, yet countries often skip
this step (Table 1). Indonesia never did prepare an overall framework and
instead went forward with two laws followed by a set of implementing reg-
ulations. The result, as discussed below, has been a good bit of \making
it up as we go" which has brought some serious challenges and has consid-
erably delayed the decentralization program.8 Decentralization has been
reasonably successful in Indonesia, despite the absence of a guiding frame-
work. The question to raise is how much more successful it would have been
with a framework. Similarly, Russia jumped into the decentralization pro-
cess in 1992 without preparing an explicit framework and overall strategy.
Successive laws and measures were often disconnected and sometimes con-
tradictory. It took Russia almost a decade to issue a comprehensive vision
of the decentralization process in what became known as the Kozak Com-
mission Report in 2002.9 Mexico's decentralization policy has continued to
drift forwards and sideways without a comprehensive reform blueprint.
Tanzania, on the other hand, did produce a White Paper on local gov-
ernment reform at the beginning of the current phase of decentralization
reforms in 1998. While this policy paper does not provide a great amount
of detail on planned scal adjustments, it lays out the government's gen-
8The problems that arose from no real scal decentralization plan were recognized by
the government, and in 2002, the Ministry of Finance issued a draft \White Paper" on
Fiscal Decentralization (Ministry of Finance, 2002). Though the basic objectives and
policies were aired out, this document was not the result of a broad national discussion.
It could however, be an input to redrafting the original laws, an exercise that was
underway at the time of this writing.
9After the August 1998 ruble crisis, a wide reform process, such as the Budget Code
and Tax Code, gained new momentum and the Government issued a document that
can also be considered a White Paper under the title of \Concept of reform of Inter-
governmental Fiscal Relations in the Russian Federation for 1999-2001." However, this
document has less buy-in and smaller scope than the Kozak Report. For a discussion,
see Martinez-Vazquez (2002).
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eral objectives for the program. By persistently emphasizing the theme of
\decentralization by devolution," Tanzania's \Government Policy Paper on
Local Government Reform" has continued to inform and order the ongoing
reform process quite successfully. Its lack of specic policy reforms may
have helped to reduce potential opposition against the reform agenda.
Elsewhere in East Africa, the experience is mixed (NCG, 2004). Uganda
adopted a scal decentralization strategy in 2002. However, the strategy
is not comprehensive and to date is still focused on reforming the system
of intergovernmental transfers. Kenya, on the other hand, has identied
some areas of local government nance reform, but has not developed a
comprehensive strategy. India is a case apart in this respect. Although
there has not been a fundamental White Paper mapping out the reform
of India's federalism, every ve years, India's Finance Commission issues a
comprehensive report on intergovernmental nance issues and options for
reform.
4.2. Sequencing
Some would argue that the single most important factor in getting a
successful decentralization in place is to include the key elements in the
policy design. But what are the key elements? And, must all be introduced
simultaneously, or are there some sequencing rules?
4.3. Fiscal Decentralization Policy Should Be Comprehensive
Intergovernmental scal relations must be thought of as a system, and
all the pieces in this system must t together (Bahl, 1999b).10 Ideally, the
implementation of a decentralization program should begin with a design
of the comprehensive system and should lay out the plan for each element
of the system. Not all of the components of decentralization will be im-
plemented right away, but it is important that all of the components be
included in the comprehensive plan.
A little reection will lead one quickly to the conclusion that scal de-
centralization involves more than what are traditionally thought of as scal
issues. In fact, the electoral system and other forms of accountability, the
civil service and a number of other institutional arrangements are arguably
as important to assuring the success of scal decentralization as are the
taxing and spending components. A \one-o" piecemeal reform, encom-
passing only one element of the system (e.g., central government revenue
sharing with local governments), is not likely to fully capture the benets
10Intergovernmental scal relations is a term that refers generally to division of scal
powers and responsibilities among levels of government. Fiscal decentralization refers
to an intergovernmental system where the balance of power moves more toward the
subnational government sector than has been the case.
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of decentralization. In fact, it can lead to undesirable outcomes, including
larger central decits and macroeconomic instability.11
The key elements to be included in the sequencing plan for scal decen-
tralization are:
 expenditure assignment and autonomy
 revenue assignment and autonomy
 design of the intergovernmental transfer system
 provisions for scal discipline
 civil service rules
 political accountability
Getting all the pieces of the scal decentralization puzzle on the table
gives the best chances for success. Making the pieces t together is the
sucient condition. In a sense, this is what the sequencing question is
all about. For example, Indonesia's big-bang decentralization of 2000 did
consider both expenditure assignment and revenue assignment, but the
planning was done by two dierent ministries with little coordination (Alm,
Aten and Bahl, 2001). There did not seem to be a plan for making the two
sides of the budget t together.
Not everyone believes that design should be comprehensive. Some coun-
tries (and international agencies) may at times think of a scal decentral-
ization program as no more than a revision of the existing revenue sharing
system, or an upgrading of the property tax administration.12 Some ig-
nore the scal issues completely and think of decentralization only in terms
of the local election system, and planners very often focus exclusively on
developing methods to get inputs from local population groups included
in the project selection discussion. The \one dimension" approach is not
likely to be sustainable or produce successful decentralization because oth-
er elements crucial to capturing the benets may not have changed in a
supportive way, or may even work to yield osetting results.
4.4. The Critical Role of Political Accountability
Accountability to local voters is perhaps the most crucial element of a de-
centralized system, and the one that ties together all the other components
of decentralization design. But is it the essential rst step in the decentral-
ization sequence? Local governments' expenditure and revenue autonomy
are less likely to be put to good use (beneting local citizens/voters) when
local government ocials are not accountable to their local constituen-
cies. More centralized systems tend to substitute vertical accountability
11See Burki, Dillinger, and Perry (1999) for a discussion on these types of problems
in Latin America.
12Of course, this may be quite correct if the issue is a correction being made to an
ongoing system of scal decentralization.
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of local ocials to higher up authorities for horizontal accountability to
citizen/voters. Vertical accountability can prevent local ocials from be-
having irresponsibly but it works much less well in making them responsive
to the needs and preferences of local residents. Horizontal accountability
is enhanced through the appointment of ocials through open politically
contested elections, as well as by other institutions including, proper pub-
licity, internal control and external audit and evaluation of budgets, a free
press, and the participation in the public discourse of non-governmental
organizations. The eciency gains that are at the heart of scal decentral-
ization strategies will not be captured if local voters cannot have a voice
in making budget choices.
Countries like China, Vietnam and Nepal, which have been pursuing
substantial decentralization reforms on many fronts, but which still do not
have contested, democratic elections, are unlikely to benet from the full
range of eciency gains associated with decentralization. In particular, the
dominance of vertical accountability to upper-level government ocials and
the desire to please them quite likely leads to distorted spending decisions
at the subnational level.13
Awareness of these issues has led both China and Vietnam to experiment
with openly contested elections at the lowest level of local government, the
rural settlements.14 A full solution to this problem will require a regime
change, which is not likely to happen anytime soon.
Does the absence of elected local governments mean that decentralization
in these countries is meaningless or ineective? It would appear that there
are still sizable advantages to be obtained from decentralization in produc-
tion eciency and competition among local governments,15 and some gains
in allocative eciency from limited levels of horizontal accountability.16
Full horizontal accountability to voters is limited in other developing
and transition countries by less than full direct elections of executive and
legislative branches of government. In a common modality, the legislative
branch is democratically elected but the executive branch is appointed by
13For example, Martinez-Vazquez, Qiao, and Wang (2005) argue that the lack of
horizontal accountability in China has led to dierent expenditure patterns in poorer
and richer provinces.
14See Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2005) for China and Martinez-Vazquez (2004) for
Vietnam.
15Montinola, Qian, and Weingast, (1995) and Qian, and Weingast, (1996) argue that
the scal decentralization process started in China in the mid-1980s with the \contract-
ing system" was \market preserving" in that it stimulated local governments to become
entrepreneurial and to seek the growth of their local economies.
16Local councils, although not freely elected, are often open to the complaints and
demands of local residents. Furthermore, local governments in richer areas where there
is more residential mobility, such as China's coastal provinces or in the Ho Chi Minh
City area in South Vietnam, need to be more responsive to the preferences and demands
of residents to retain and attract qualied workers and to compete for investors.
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the center, as will now be the case in Russia's regions. Representatives
may be indirectly elected by lower-level governments, as in the case of
the district councils in the Czech Republic. The point with any of these
variations is that accountability and, therefore the overall performance of
decentralization, will be hurt the further away the system moves from full
democratic institutions. Even the method followed in democratic elections
may have consequences for accountability. For example, proportional rep-
resentation under closed-party list systems may generate strong alliances
and accountability toward the party bosses in the capital of the country
in comparison to the greater responsiveness to local issues in the case of
district-wide winner-take-all open elections.
4.5. Finance Should Follow Function
It is important to get the correct order of reform as regards to how
much should be spent by subnational governments, and how much revenue
should be given to subnational governments. There is a conventional wis-
dom. First should come the assignment of expenditure responsibility to
subnational governments, and then the assignment of revenue raising pow-
ers and central government revenue shares should be determined. There is
a good logic to this nance-follows-function rule.
The rst reason is that one cannot establish the required level of sub-
national government revenues independent of an estimate of expenditure
needs.17 The second reason is that it becomes dicult to eectively impose
a hard budget constraint at the subnational level if there is an insucient
revenue assignment. Examples abound of local governments being given
expenditure responsibilities and mandates that exceed their assigned rev-
enues. Local governments may take this to mean that they are expected
to overspend and that the decit will be covered by the higher level gov-
ernment. If, on the other hand, subnational government revenues are over
assigned relative to expenditure needs, then the central government can
become scally strapped and there will be pressures on the central budget
decit. Such was the case in China in the mid-1990s.
There is a third argument for nance to follow function, and this is
discussed less often. The economically ecient assignment of revenues re-
quires a prior knowledge of expenditure assignment. For example, services
that may be priced (public utilities, bus transportation) should be large-
ly nanced by user charges; general services with a local area benet zone
(roads, parks) should be nanced with local taxes; and goods characterized
by signicant externalities should be nanced from region-wide taxes and
17Note that even if the subnational government revenue share is determined on a basis
of expenditure needs, it does not follow that there will be a correspondence for every
local government. The nance follows function rule applies only to the aggregate vertical
share.
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intergovernmental transfers. A blanket statement that the aggregate of
local government services should be nanced by user charges, local taxes,
and intergovernmental transfers, simply misses the eciency point. Gov-
ernment must settle on the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to
local governments, before it can choose an ecient mix of taxes (Bahl and
Linn, 1992).
Despite all this good a priori reasoning, most countries begin intergov-
ernmental reform on the revenue side. Examples of this sequencing mistake
abound in Latin America. Currently, Thailand is in the midst of approach-
ing policy in this fashion. And, there are some who would see this as a
not-too-serious policy mistake. One justication for this \back-end" ap-
proach is that the expenditure needs of subnational governments often are
so great that feasible intergovernmental revenue reform programs do not
typically make much of a dent in the service level and infrastructure back-
log. In such a case, it is sometimes argued that it matters little where one
begins. This would seem a awed argument, though. All that happens in
this case is that standards for minimum subnational government services
are increased or reduced in an implicit way. It is far better to do this reduc-
tion explicitly than implicitly. This argues for starting intergovernmental
scal reform on the expenditure side.
Another reason why many countries get the revenue and expenditure
assignment decision in the wrong order is that the revenue side is easier to
work. Politically, at the central level, it is rather easy for a President to
propose and a parliament to approve a proposition for a given percentage
of central government revenues to be shared with local governments. This
is a populist measure that not very many outside the government or inside
the government, with the possible exception of the Ministry of Finance, will
oppose. Political opposition is more likely to take place for issues involving
the decentralization of expenditure responsibilities. From the perspective
of local governments, an entitlement to some level of revenue sharing is
clearly more attractive than being assigned expenditure responsibilities for
which there may or may not be adequate funding.18
A positive argument for starting the process on the revenue side is that
the assignment of revenue to local governments may dampen the resistance
of line ministries to the expenditure reassignment that will follow. Once
the funds to support certain functions have been transferred, there may be
18The exception is those countries where decentralization is driven by political, ethnic,
or separatist reasons. In this case regional and local governments are eager to get as
much expenditure responsibility as possible even if it is well known that the nances
may not follow for some time to come. That is the position taken, for example, by ethnic
republics in Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, or by the ethnic Indonesian
provinces of Aceh and Papua-New Guinea.
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less of a rationale for line ministries to argue to keep control over direct
delivery.
The assignment of expenditure responsibility is a much more politically
charged issue. Giving local governments signicant control over the expen-
diture budget reduces the control that can be exerted by the line ministries
and shifts the balance of power away from the center. Moreover, once de-
centralized to local governments, expenditures are not so easily controlled
or \called back." Revenue assignment, as practiced in most developing
countries, is a less permanent proposition: local tax rates can be limited
or subject to approval, intergovernmental transfers to local governments
might not be delivered as promised, and all borrowing might be subject to
central government approval.
On the implementation side, policy analysts know well how to design re-
forms in tax systems and intergovernmental transfer systems, implement-
ing these reforms is a manageable issue and such reforms can yield visible
short-term results. The decentralization of expenditure responsibility pos-
es more challenging implementation problems. First, the decentralization
of expenditure responsibilities needs to be implemented in the context of
reformed national sectoral laws (e.g. Education Law, Health Law, etc.).
This will lead to redenition of the role to be played by line ministries
and other central government agencies within the new decentralized frame-
work. The failure to coordinate central government sectoral policies with
decentralization policy generally leads to confrontations between agencies
at dierent levels of government, confusion in expenditure assignment, and
inecient outcomes. Second, subnational governments must have the ca-
pacity to deliver the newly assigned services or to develop the new skills to
do so. The public policy fear is that service quality will deteriorate while
local governments are climbing the learning curve.
Most bothersome of all, there are no hard and fast rules about which
functions should be assigned to which level of government. Expenditure
assignment decisions should be based on a painstaking unbundling of each
function into sub functions, and for concurrent functions, the identica-
tion of attributes for regulation, nancing and implementation, and then
analysis of the viability of each as a central, state or local responsibility.19
Policy analysts, international donors, and central ministries all nd reasons
to shy away from this dicult analytic task.
Some analysts and even policy makers in countries undergoing recent de-
centralization take an \evolutionary" view of the expenditure assignment
question. In this mind frame, the dierent levels of government will even-
tually sort out the functions they should perform. After all, it is claimed,
one can nd decentralized developed countries with rather stable and well
19For a discussion of expenditure unbundling in the India context, see Sethi (2004).
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sorted out expenditure assignments at dierent levels of government, which
never had a comprehensive law that explicitly stated expenditure assign-
ments. However, this argument ignores the fact that it may have taken
these countries decades, if not centuries, of political friction and inecient
public sector operations to arrive at the de facto expenditure assignments
one can observe today.
Is there a correct way to implement the nance-follows-function rule for
sequencing? We suggest a three-step process. First, one might begin by
clearly assigning a package of expenditure responsibilities to subnation-
al governments on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, benet areas of
services and externalities present, economies of scale and scope, and best
international practice. This is to some extent a subjective exercise, and
there is no unique answer for every country. In fact, many countries apply
these exact criteria and come to dierent answers about what subnational
governments should do.
The second step is to establish the cost of providing minimum levels
of these services. As in the case for expenditure assignment, there is no
one best way to do this. The international practice suggests three basic
approaches:
One can use a \retrospective" methodology and try to calculate a cost
that is equivalent to the moneys spent on those services before they were
decentralized (e.g., Spain). This approach simply assigns a vertical share of
revenues to the subnational government sector that is adequate in amount
to cover the existing level of spending for the functions being reassigned.
The advantage of this approach is that it is relatively easy to implement
and minimizes disruption. The disadvantage is that it assumes that existing
levels of spending are somehow \proper," when in fact it is these existing
levels that may have prompted the move toward decentralization in the rst
place. If it is done on a region-by-region basis, it may perpetuate the service
and funding inequities of the past. This approach is also problematic in a
dynamic sense, for example if it is used to evaluate expenditure needs in
equalization transfers formulae in future years, because the distribution of
population and other conditions may change very fast.
A second approach is to establish minimum spending levels by using per
capita (or per client) nancial norms. An advantage of this method is that
the per capita nancial norms can be modied by information on existing
conditions in the local government areas, such as dierences in prices due
to climate or geography (e.g., South Africa, Ukraine, and the U.K.).
A more complicated approach is to dene minimum physical service s-
tandards for the provision of each service and try to cost them out sep-
arately (e.g. Japan, the Netherlands, and Denmark). This approach has
the advantage of allowing a costing of the inputs required for delivering a
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minimum level of services. Hence it can provide detailed information on
the cost implications of higher or lower vertical shares.
The third step in this process is to bring aordability into the discussion.
Ultimately, the choice of an exact minimum service level will be driven by
aordability. While the retrospective method ensures aordability, the per
capita method and the method that costs out and adds up physical norms
and standards do not.20 What is aordable is also driven by national
priorities. Thus, how a country ends up quantifying expenditure needs also
depends on the national consensus regarding how important some services
are vis-a-vis others, and in particular the importance of those assigned
to the subnational sector vs. those retained at the central level. Some
methods for quantifying expenditure needs, for example nancial per capita
expenditure norms, are more adaptable to changes in national priorities
than others.
There is one last normative issue to be considered. This is whether ex-
penditure assignments should be uniform for all subnational units. The
alternative is some asymmetric treatment depending on administrative ca-
pacity and readiness of subnational governments to absorb expanded ex-
penditure responsibilities. Asymmetric treatments have the disadvantage
of creating complexity but the ability to adapt to very dierent condition-
s and capabilities may more than oset that disadvantage. Furthermore,
asymmetric treatments are by nature temporary, because local governments
have an incentive to use all the technical assistance provided so that they
can graduate and assume the competencies assigned to their peers.
The arguments for nance to follow function do not seem to have fully
persuaded international practice, as described in Table 1.
20We should note that the problem of quantifying needs is not unique to expendi-
ture assignments. Equalization transfer systems that take into account needs also are
presented with the same exact problem.
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4.6. The Signicance of Local Revenue Autonomy
It is important to a complete decentralization that subnational govern-
ments have independent sources of revenue. If all nancing is from revenue
sharing and other forms of transfers from higher-level governments, there
is a danger of the lower level government becoming a spending agent for
the center. Such an arrangement can give subnational governments less
discretion in deciding how much they will spend, and how they will spend
it in the case of conditional grants. The imposition of a hard budget con-
straint is more dicult when there is no local revenue raising capability.
Once a culture of dependency on revenue sharing and transfers is creat-
ed, subnational governments will always push for more funding from above
as opposed to using their own revenue autonomy. As the international
experience shows, many central/federal governments eventually succumb
to demands and pressures from below for more revenue sharing, and the
pattern continues.
There are several important benecial eects of subnational government
revenue autonomy that are often overlooked. First, subnational tax au-
tonomy is the best way, if not the only way, to address permanently the
problem of vertical imbalances in scal decentralization design. Second,
there cannot be discretion as regards to the level of expenditure and a
hard budget constraint on subnational governments unless at the margin
they are required to use their own revenue instruments to raise additional
revenues. Third, revenue autonomy is a key indicator of subnational gov-
ernments' borrowing capacity and creditworthiness. All of this argues for
revenue raising to be an early decision in the design of a scal decentral-
ization strategy.
In practice, local revenue sources are often not part of the initial decen-
tralization package. To some extent, this is because there is no constituency
for this policy. Central government ocials do not want to devolve taxing
powers for fear of competing with local governments for the same taxing
base. Subnational government ocials are loathe to take on the responsibil-
ity of making politically unpopular taxing decisions to meet budget needs.
Moreover, some local ocials may fear that new local taxing powers may
be accompanied by a more equalizing distribution of intergovernmental
transfers that would penalize their increased tax eort. Intergovernmental
transfers are seen to be a much easier path for all concerned.
Of the ve country cases highlighted here, Indonesia, Russia and Tan-
zania provide subnational governments with little discretion to raise tax
revenues. Mexican municipal governments cover about one-third of expen-
ditures from their own sources but state governments are mostly dependent
on transfers. India's states do have signicant taxing powers but urban and
rural governments are mostly limited to the property tax. A more detailed
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discussion of subnational government revenue raising power is summarized
in Table 1.
4.7. Design of the Intergovernmental Transfer System
An important sequencing question has to do with the design and imple-
mentation of intergovernmental transfers. The right order of policy formu-
lation is to rst ask and answer the question about which of many possible
objectives the intergovernmental transfer system is to accomplish, and then
to design the reformed system.
There are many dierent kinds of intergovernmental transfer systems,
and they have many dierent types of impacts on local government -
nances.21 Some stimulate local spending, some are substituted for local
revenue eort, some are equalizing, and some lead to more local govern-
ment scal autonomy than others.22 Countries too often enter into the
process of grant design without clear objectives for what the transfer sys-
tem is to accomplish.
The major issue is that dierent types of transfers have dierent ob-
jectives, and it is important to sequence grant design according to these
objectives. One goal is to reconcile the dierence between the assignment
of expenditure responsibility and the assignment of revenue raising power-
s. This vertical balance goal of transfers is arguably the rst job to take
care of in designing the transfer system. The second step in grant system
design is to implement conditional grants for those functions of nation-
al/regional importance where it is feared that under-provision might take
place without assistance. Finally, the equalization grants should be de-
signed to address the horizontal imbalances that result after the rst two
pieces of the transfer system are designed.
Often, countries do not design their intergovernmental transfer systems
in so rational a way, as can be seen for the ve countries highlighted in this
study in Table 1.
4.8. Subnational Governments Must Face a Hard Budget Con-
straint23
Fiscal discipline is a key element of a successful decentralization strat-
egy. It is important that it be introduced when the program begins. If
21There is often a debate about what is an \intergovernmental transfer." Grants to
lower-level governments are clearly intergovernmental transfers. The confusion comes in
the case of shared taxes and tax expenditures. We would argue the following: If the local
government can control either the rate or base of a levy, it is a tax. If the rate and base
are determined by the higher-level government, and revenue collections are assigned to
the local government, it is a transfer. If the central government allows deductibility of
property taxes from central income tax liability, it is likewise a form of transfer.
22For a primer on transfer design issues see Bahl, Boex, and Martinez-Vazquez (2001).
23See Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2003).
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subnational governments are not forced to operate with balanced budget-
s, they become accustomed to looking to the higher level governments to
cover their shortfalls. The moral hazard here is that the subnational gov-
ernments will consciously overspend knowing that their losses will be made
good. Furthermore, a soft budget constraint will tend to discourage their
own tax eort and encourage inecient and even wasteful spending. As
many countries have learned, it is dicult to break the culture of a soft
budget constraint.
A hard budget constraint implies that those local governments who are
given autonomy will be asked to balance their budgets without recourse
to any end-of-year assistance from the central government. Central gov-
ernments must enforce this rule, and local governments must believe that
they are \on their own." For a hard budget constraint to be an eec-
tive feature of intergovernmental scal policy, the higher level government
should be mostly committed to a \no-bailout strategy" and to shy away
from year-end decit grants. A hard budget constraint is not always a cen-
tral tenet of decentralization. Many central governments prefer to hold to
a paternalistic approach to intergovernmental scal relations characterized
by insucient formal revenue assignments, fuzzy ex-ante levels of transfers,
and year-end results covered by some sort of decit grants. In other cases,
there may simply be a awed design of the intergovernmental scal system.
Brazils states did not face a hard budget constraint and increased current
expenditures in the 1990s even when the resources were not available to
cover debt repayment. Ultimately, there was a federal bailout.
The experience in the country cases studied here has varied. Indonesia
does impose a hard budget constraint on local governments. Two factors
are important in assuring this scal balance: there are few avenues open to
local governments to nance a decit, and the primary intergovernmental
transfer was set at a level sucient to cover personnel costs. India, on
the other hand, is at the opposite extreme with state governments running
decits of signicant size. The Union government has adopted numerous
policies that encourage this behavior.
Mexico and Russia are somewhere in between. After a period of allowing
a soft constraint on regional government budgets (through loan forgiveness
and year-end \mutual settlements"), Russia has moved to adoption of a
hard budget constraint for subnational governments. Mexico has a history
of bailouts and of fearing the scal failure of important subnational govern-
ments, hence its threat of imposing a hard budget constraint for the future
may lack credibility.
4.9. The Decentralization Law
It is essential that legislation govern decentralization, and that it is un-
ambiguous. It would seem almost axiomatic that the development of the
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decentralization law should follow the policy design. Otherwise, how could
it reect the goals of government and the consensus resulting from the
national debate?
There is much to be said about dening the best legal framework for
decentralization. A fundamental question would seem to be how much of
the decentralization framework should be in the constitution and how much
should be in the decentralization law. This is a crucial sequencing decision,
though for countries with longstanding traditions of decentralization, this
question may have long ago been resolved. What shape decentralization
takes in federal systems is fundamental to the very nature of the state
and therefore the division of powers and responsibilities among the federal
and subnational governments is an intrinsic part of the constitution in
these countries. This is, for example, the case of three federal countries
considered here: India, Mexico and Russia.
How much detail there is in the constitution about intergovernmental re-
lations and how much is structured in separate laws varies from country to
country. India's Constitution is much more detailed about how scal rela-
tions (expenditure and revenue assignments and so on) should be structured
than are the Constitutions of Russia and Mexico. In the case of Russia,
two fundamental codied laws (the Budget Code and the Tax Code) now
represent the legal backbone of the decentralization system. In the case of
Mexico, the most important pieces of decentralization have been built by
specialized laws either on the nancing side (e.g., the National System of
Fiscal Coordination law) or the expenditure side (e.g., the Education law)
of the budget.
Although all power resides with the central government in unitary states,
it is not uncommon in the constitutions of these countries (e.g., Indone-
sia and Tanzania) not only to acknowledge the existence of subnational
governments but also to address some of the fundamental issues on how
intergovernmental relations should be organized. Typically, this is done
with much less detail and concreteness than in the case of federal coun-
try constitutions. In the case of unitary countries, it is more common to
nd specialized laws focused exclusively on scal decentralization issues.
Indonesia's Law 22 on expenditure assignments and Law 25 on revenue
assignments and transfers are cases in point. Although Tanzania's consti-
tution makes reference to the role of local governments, the (scal) powers
of local governments in Tanzania emanate primarily from the Local Gov-
ernment Acts (1982).24
24The biggest problem in Tanzania in this regard has been that rather than replacing
the previous legislation and regulations, the existing legislation tends to be amended with
additional clauses. Over two decades of incremental reform, this has led to numerous
instances of unnecessary duplicative clauses. As a result, a major review and \cleaning
up" of the Local Government (Finance) Act will be needed in the near future.
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Whatever the country's legal tradition, the essential goal is to have ex-
plicit and clear legal rules governing decentralization. It is often argued
that these rules should always be part of the country's Constitution. This
position is taken by those that fear the discretionary and potentially abu-
sive exercise of power by the central government. Having these rules in
the constitution is a measure of protection for local governments' interest,
probably a protection that is as good as it gets. Changing the countrys con-
stitution requires jumping through many more hoops, but it can be done
and it has been done. On the other hand, there also are some drawbacks
to using the Constitution as the vehicle for structuring intergovernmental
relations. An important one is the lack of exibility and adaptation to
changing needs and circumstances. If one views the intergovernmental s-
cal relations as a continuous changing reality and sees a need for the legal
system to adapt to this changing reality, then the role of the Constitution
should be just to announce general principles and leave the details to laws
and regulations.25 In fact, this is an important sequencing decision.
India illustrates some of the perils of putting too much detail about
intergovernmental scal relations in the Constitution. In particular, the
decision to specify revenue assignments between the Union and the states in
the Constitution has resulted in inexible and outmoded revenue structure
for India. The Indian Constitution assigns to the states, among others,
the tax on the sale and purchase of goods (but not services) and tax on
agricultural incomes and wealth (but not incomes from other sectors).26
Any tax residuary powers are vested with the central government. This
has led to the paradoxical situation that the sales (and purchases) of goods
are taxed at the state level, the sales of services can only be taxed at the
federal level.27 Allowing state governments to tax services would require
a constitutional amendment. This situation has made it very dicult to
reform indirect taxation in India, i.e., to introduce a VAT at the state
and federal levels. Similarly, because the states can only tax income from
agriculture, this has ruled out an income tax or piggyback income tax
25The constitution can be eectively used to state general principles of tax assignments
and other aspects of decentralization. One example is the prohibition of border taxes or
similar levies that impede commerce and trade between subnational jurisdictions, as is
the case, for example, with the \commerce clause" in the United States Constitution.
26Other items in the closed list of taxes assigned to the states include stamp duties on
registration fees, excise duties on the sales of alcoholic products, tax on motor vehicles,
and tax on goods and passengers transported through roads and inland waterways.
27The division of tax bases between the union and state governments appears to be
quite arbitrary from today's perspective although for sure there were some reasons that
would have seemed relevant to the framers of the Constitution many decades back. This
illustrates the point that the constitution is a more inexible legal vehicle for structuring
intergovernmental scal relations.
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at the state level. Again, introducing this type of reform will require a
constitutional amendment.
Similar problems arose in Brazil. The 1998 Constitution gave state gov-
ernments signicant tax authority and guaranteed transfers, but it did little
by way of specifying expenditure responsibilities for the states (Rodden,
215). The result was confusion over responsibility for service provision.
On the other hand, the constitution restricted the right of states to dismiss
public employees or reduce their salaries. This signicantly compromised
the position of the states in regards to control over their budgets.
Whatever the approach chosen, relying more on the Constitution or more
on other laws, it is clear that no legal documents can be as complete as to
eliminate all possible ambiguities or dierences in interpretation of the same
legal text by two parties with potentially conicting interests. Therefore,
as the old wisdom goes, there is no system of federalism | and we will add,
or of a decentralized system | that is complete without an independent
and strong judiciary.
4.10. Implementing Regulations
The implementing regulations must t between the development of the
Law and the actual implementation of the system. Without the law, the
regulations become decentralization policy, a most undesirable state of af-
fairs. If there are no regulations, those who put the decentralization pro-
grams in action are free to do so as they wish.
The implementing regulations specify the detail for the roll out of the
decentralization program. Like the law, these regulations follow the policy
framework by providing the detail that governs the administration of the
new system. Unlike the law, the implementing regulations can be easily
changed. The major issue that arises is what should be included in the
law and what should be included in the implementing regulations. The
international practice varies with the legal traditions of countries. For
example, Russia's tradition of codied laws follows the continental legal
tradition of incorporating in the law more detail and interpretation than is
the case in the common law tradition. In Indonesia, laws contain very little
detail because traditionally the country has relied on the implementing
regulations to structure many important aspects of a reform.
What is the right division of content between laws and regulations? The
Law should include those things that Government feels are to be relative-
ly permanent in decentralization policy. For example, provisions for the
election of local ocials, basic expenditure and revenue assignments, the
fundamental structure of the equalization grant, or the civil service status
of local and central government employees are not likely to change over
time | or at least should not change frequently | and properly belong
in the law. Other factors, such as the weighting parameters in the inter-
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governmental transfer formula or provisions for revenue sharing rates or
administration arrangements, may change with economic development and
other changing circumstances and probably belong with the implementing
regulations rather than the law.
Getting the implementing regulations out of sequence can be quite dis-
ruptive of the decentralization program. If these are written before the
policy paper is completed, then the regulations themselves become an im-
portant part of the decentralization policy. This is part of a \make it up
as you go" approach. The implementing regulations in this case would be
written by dierent government ministries following more or less their own
preferences and the dierent pieces are unlikely to t any unied strategy.
On the other hand, if the implementing regulations are not written be-
fore the start of the implementation period, then it is left to those who
administer the new program to decide on the elements of the decentraliza-
tion. For example, if the exact assignment of functions is not made clear,
then it may be left to the subnational governments to decide what they will
and will not deliver, or to the central government line ministries to decide
how much control they will relinquish.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
Implementation of a decentralization program involves more than simply
a passing of administrative responsibilities to lower levels of government. It
involves developing a strategy for implementation and a signicant amount
of planning and fails safe provisions to accommodate failures in the ear-
ly stages of decentralization. This planning is part of the design phase
of the sequencing. Actual implementation comes after the implementing
regulations are complete.
5.1. Transition Measures: Asymmetric Decentralization
The transfer of scal powers to local governments may or may not in-
volve a one-o delegation of the same authority to every local government.
Governments in many countries believe that there must be a uniform inter-
governmental scal system under which all subnational governments must
operate. Certainly there are good arguments for this. If all subnational
governments have the same expenditure responsibilities and revenue raising
powers, management of the system and evaluation of its success is much
easier. Moreover, there is no hint of political favoritism as ad hoc dieren-
tiation among local units is not permitted. Uniform symmetrical systems
seem fairer. By design, Tanzanias system of local government nance is
perfectly symmetric.
There is another view, that uniformity may not be a necessary condition
for eective decentralization. In fact, a better route may be to begin s-
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cal decentralization with the larger local government units and to let the
smaller ones \grow into it." Subnational governments have very dierent
capabilities to deliver and nance services, and certainly dierent capa-
bilities to borrow. It may be necessary to set up a system where these
dierences are explicitly recognized, i.e., where dierent local governments
are given dierent nancing powers and expenditure responsibilities. Places
with limited capability could rely more heavily on grants and perhaps have
less expenditure responsibilities, while local governments with greater ad-
ministrative capacity or more developed places in general could rely more
heavily on local taxation and could borrow to nance capital outlays. In
countries that choose this route, it is necessary to have a clear set of rules
about when a local government graduates from one status to another, and
to have systems in place for training, and so on, that allow local govern-
ments to graduate faster if they so desire. It is not at all uncommon to
see such gradations, e.g., the Kenyan municipalities and cities, large cities
in some American states, South African municipalities and cities, Indian
urban governments, and many national capital districts are given special
scal powers.28 Countries like Spain and Colombia have successfully used
asymmetric approaches in the decentralization of expenditure responsibil-
ities.
Asymmetric approaches to revenue and expenditure assignments are used
sometimes in response to either special political demands or try and satisfy
separatist forces. At some point during the transition, the Russian federal
government had secret treaties providing asymmetric status to a number
of Russian regions to accommodate all sorts of demands. More uniform
treatment of all the regions in Russia have followed after years of recen-
tralization and hard discipline introduced by President Putin (Martinez-
Vazquez, 2002). Many other decentralized countries (e.g., Canada, Spain,
etc.) function with dierent forms, at times quite radical, of asymmetric
federalism (see Bird and Ebel, forthcoming). But even in systems where
asymmetry is involved, there are certain common features that tie all lo-
cal governments together. There should be one law common to all local
governments in the system and one uniform set of accounting and auditing
rules.
5.2. Building Capacity
Perhaps the biggest constraint to the implementation of a decentralized
system of government is the lack of administrative capacity by local govern-
ments. When decentralization takes place and the administrative capacity
is not in place, what may follow is poor performance in service delivery
28It is very dicult to identify a set of characteristics that prescribe when a local gov-
ernment should move to the next class of scal autonomy. Most countries use population
size as the classication criteria.
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with all sorts of ineciencies, waste, corruption, and lack of accountability.
Systemic failure of local governments to deliver services is in the long term
the worst enemy of decentralized governance. Sooner or later the solution
found will be to recentralize the public nances.29
The lack of local government capacity is often used to justify tepid decen-
tralization or no decentralization at all. This is the most common reason
given in \half-baked" decentralization processes, such as in India or Mexico,
where decentralization has stopped at the intermediate level of government
and has not reached third-tier local governments in a meaningful way. Full
decentralization reform to local governments has been stalled in Tanzania
because of the alleged lack of capacity among most local governments. At
the other extreme, the big bang decentralization reform in Indonesia was
carefree about the lack of capacity among many local governments and
fully decentralized to local governments while bypassing the intermediate
(provincial) level of government. The reform was uniform and there was
little accommodation for lack of capacity at the local level. The risks were
minimized, however, because a deconcentration system of service delivery
was already in place.
In many ways the issue of lack of capacity at the local government level
is a \chicken and the egg" dilemma. Decentralization may not take place
because of the lack of capacity but capacity has never developed because
there never has been any meaningful degree of decentralization. The right
approach to this issue is a pro-active policy that combines capacity training
and asymmetric measures with progressive devolution of responsibilities
and nancing instruments. It does not make much sense to wait for decades,
like in India, for the capacity to appear at the local level. At such a pace
local governments may never be ready. But the need for resources and a
strategy may not be the main obstacle to developing capacity at the local
level; rather, the problem may be entirely political. This is true because
intermediate level governments, even though they may demand as much
decentralization as possible from their central governments, often like to
act as highly centralized mini states vis-a-vis their local governments.
5.3. Contingency Funds
Like most other government policies, decentralization policy is designed
and implemented with limited information and therefore there is always
the risk that things may not come out as expected. For this reason, it is
important to provide the implementation process with contingency funds to
cover unforeseen circumstances. When Indonesia embarked on its big bang
decentralization the Government arranged for several contingency funds to
29Political memories tend to be short and it may not matter much that service delivery
was not better under a previous centralized approach.
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help with the nances of those local governments that may have run short
of funds to pay employee salaries and the like.
Big Bang or Gradual Implementation?
A gradual implementation of reform is thought by many to be more
desirable than a hurried up, \big bang" approach. There are two good
reasons why this might be preferred: (a) limited available information to
allow good predictions on how things will eventually work out, in contrast
to how they were planned, and (b) the cost of reform can be substantial,
and gradual approaches allow this to be spread out over a number of years.
In short, gradual approaches carry much less risk.
To argue for the proper sequencing of reform as we do in this paper
is probably to argue in favor of gradualism in its implementation. The
question is what form of gradualism is best. Systems that are political-
ly centralized, like China today, may have the luxury of trying out pilot
reforms to check for problems and \wrinkles" before rolling out the re-
forms for the entire country. But piloting and experiments are not always
possible and may not even be desirable if there is urgency to the prob-
lems that need to be addressed. Gradualism may also be understood in
the context of asymmetric approaches to decentralization. For example,
the Spanish Constitution in the post-Franco era allowed for several speeds
of decentralization reform, to a large extent based on historical autonomic
demands of a handful or regions vis-a-vis the rest of the country. Decentral-
ization reform in that country was spread over several decades, but some
regions got on with the reforms much faster than others.30 In Colombia,
the asymmetric approach and dierences in speed of implementation were
based more on administrative capacity reasons than on historical reason-
s. In short, even though there are dierent interpretations of gradualism,
many of them acceptable in their particular country context, we believe
that the best interpretation of gradualism is the paced implementation of
the sequencing being presented in this paper.
But two important qualications should be added to that statement.
First, we must not see the type of gradualism being proposed here as a
substitute for a comprehensive blue print for decentralization reform. This
confusion has often been found in the general debate in the economics liter-
ature over the proper pace of economic policy reform.31 As already stated
several times throughout this paper, in our view a gradual implementation
30At present all regions in Spain have reached the same level of decentralization but
asymmetries persist, especially in revenue assignments, with special privileges for the
Basque Country and Navarre, because of constitutional design based on the interpreta-
tion of separate historical traditions.
31For example, McMillan (2004) recently argues for a step-by step approach to (gener-
al) economic reform but identies this approach with the absence of any comprehensive
blueprint.
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approach should always be based on an explicit plan with goals and the
institutional changes necessary to get there.
A second qualication in regards to the superiority of a gradual approach
is that policy makers usually do not have the opportunity to reform in a
gradual fashion. It is well accepted that timing is critical in policy success.
For example, an economic crisis and political transition from an authoritar-
ian and highly centralized regime may provide a very limited window of op-
portunity to advance reforms that, it may be believed, under other circum-
stances may be very hard or even impossible to introduce. Going for a big
bang approach to decentralization reform in these circumstances can be a
measured and acceptable risk. That was the situation in Indonesia after the
resignation of President Suharto in 1998. With several years now passed,
Indonesia's big bang reform appears to have been successful.32 Perhaps
one can look to other transitional countries that implemented very rapid
decentralization reforms accompanied by other general economic reforms,
such as Estonia and Poland, where the big bang approach has worked.
None of the other countries of reference in this study implemented a big
bang approach,33 not even Russia, which in some circles has been often
interpreted as an example of failure of the big bang approach to general
economic reform. The evidence from other developing countries is that a
big bang approach can fail to deliver. For example, Giugale et al. (2000)
point out that the Latin American experience with decentralization shows
that big bang, abrupt reform eorts in countries such as Brazil, Colombia,
Bolivia and Venezuela during the 1980s and 1990s generally failed.
Transition Measures: Hold Harmless versus \Cold Turkey"
Many forms of scal decentralization reform imply that there will be win-
ners and losers among the subnational governments. Sometimes, politically
and/or economically powerful subnational governments may eectively ve-
to the reform unless their concerns about the losers under the new system
are taken into account. For example, the powerful tax rebate system intro-
duced in China to compensate the rich coastal provinces for the other eects
of the 1994 reform can be interpreted in this light. More often, a particular-
ly dicult issue arises when the system of distributing intergovernmental
transfers among local governments is dramatically changed, as for exam-
ple from a negotiated system to a formula-based system. This change will
almost certainly produce local governments who make big gains from the
new formula transfers, and others who face big revenue losses. Usually, the
local government service delivery system, and the local political system,
32The Indonesia approach included some safeguards such as the provision (which ap-
parently was never used) that provinces would assume responsibility for service delivery
if local governments were unable to do so.
33India can be interpreted as a paramount example of gradualism in reform, and one
that also illustrates well that gradualism per se does not deliver success either.
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cannot withstand large one-time shocks without causing turmoil in the de-
livery of essential services. In these cases, some form of phase-in of the new
system is called for.
Indonesia's big bang decentralization called for a switch from an infras-
tructure grant program, and a grant program designed to nance the com-
pensation of government employees working at the local level, to a formula-
based unconditional grant program. The \entitlements" under the old sys-
tem had built up over time, and it was exactly these inequities that the
new system was designed to eliminate. Nevertheless, a signicant shock
would have resulted had the new formula system been introduced in one
scal year. Instead, the decision was made to phase in the new system,
and in the early years, to hold all \losing" local governments harmless at
their pre-reform levels. The mistake in the Indonesian transition was that
the period it would take to phase in the new formula was left unspecied,
leaving the door open for politicians to use hold harmless provisions to
advantage their constituent local governments.34 The result was a longer
phase-in period than might have been desired.
Tanzania is also moving to a formula grant from a system where the
distributions to local governments were negotiated. The same situation
exists as in Indonesia: there is no reason to expect that any fair formula
for supporting health and education nance will bear any relationship to
the previous negotiated distribution. There would be winners and losers.
As big a concern was the possibility that winners might include previously
under-funded local authorities who would not have the capability of e-
ciently handling a large windfall gain in revenues. The government has
decided to use a hold harmless approach and to phase in the new grant
program over a period of years. Although the transfer system current-
ly holds local governments harmless against their previous year's transfer
levels, one year into the program, the exact transition period has not yet
been dened. However, the Government is in the process of deciding on a
deadline for phasing out the hold harmless provision.35
34Part of the concern by Parliament for phasing in the transition to a new transfer
system is that the loser local governments may not have had enough funds to pay the
salaries of their employees (many of whom recently had been shifted down from the
central government payrolls.) As already pointed out above, the current policy is to go
back to direct transfers for employee salaries and discharge the equalization grant from
the hold harmless provision, which has limited its eectiveness for the last three years.
35Several problems are preventing the Government from phasing out the hold-harmless
provisions sooner rather than later. First, the Public Service Act/Regulations technically
still allows central ministries to appoint teachers at the local level. As long as this is
the case, local governments have to be held harmless for decisions they have no control
over. Second, with elections at the end of this year, politically this is not seen as a good
time to announce the phasing out.
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But not all countries provide for a formal hold harmless transition sys-
tem. When no formal transition system exists, it does not mean that
there is not an informal one. For example, the introduction in Russia of a
formula-driven system in substitution for negotiated ad hoc transfers did
not provide for a formal transition mechanism. But the federal governmen-
t continued to use \mutual settlement" transfers as the means to cushion
the impact of the changes. On top of that, the Duma or parliament in-
tervened and changed the actual allocations of the formula-driven transfer
to t what it thought was the \just" allocation for four years until a new
formula was introduced in 1998. South Africa, on the other hand, dened
and implemented a four year phase in period for its formula-based equitable
shares grant to local governments.
In other cases there is no need for hold-harmless provisions because most
of the reforms are done in a gradual fashion anyway without any large
changes in the distribution of transfers. This has been the case of India,
with its gradual reforms of intergovernmental transfers, implemented over a
period of sixty years. Other countries may make a hold harmless provision
unnecessary because the change is implemented in such as way that there
are no net losers or because the change is made voluntary. This latter
illustrates the path followed by Canada and Mexico to the reforms of the
revenue assignments over the last three decades.
6. MONITORING AND EVALUATION
Many developing and transitional countries may be characterized as very
centralized systems of government and are likely to remain centralized for
quite some time. A plausible scenario in such countries is that scal de-
centralization will be to a large degree controlled and regulated from the
center.
In some cases the control will reect hesitancy on the part of the higher-
level government to give powers to a new group of bureaucrats. But in
other cases, regulation and oversight can be seen as a needed feature of the
scal decentralization structure. The following are some examples of the
latter:
As subnational governments move toward debt nancing of capital im-
provements, central governments will be called on to establish disclosure
requirement and enforce borrowing limits. The center must monitor the
scal performance of local governments, and identify those in nancial d-
iculties as well as those exerting weak revenue mobilization eorts. The
success of central government nance instruments (transfers, subsidies, lo-
cal taxes) should be monitored annually and ne-tuned periodically.
Compliance with the terms of conditional grants, expenditure mandates
and taxing limits need to be conrmed by the center. There is need for the
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center to provide technical assistance to local governments in several areas.
Especially the smaller local governments require assistance in areas such
as accounting, treasury, tax administration, data processing, and project
evaluation.
Typically, central and state governments in most developing and tran-
sition countries are not up to the task of monitoring and evaluating local
governments. The two ingredients necessary to this job are (a) a scal
analysis unit, probably best located in the Ministry of Finance, with sta
adequate to continuously monitor local government nances, and (b) an
extensive data system that will allow quantitative monitoring and evalua-
tion.
A key underlying requirement for successful scal decentralization is a u-
niform structure of subnational government accounts that are regularly and
properly audited. There are problems with the availability of such a com-
prehensive data system in most developing countries. A census of govern-
ment nances, reporting the actual nancial outcomes for every subnational
government, is essential information if the performance of the intergovern-
mental system is to be monitored. Yet, it is not common in developing
countries to have an up-to-date information system that describes the -
nances of subnational governments in detail. Rarer yet is a scal analysis
model that is used to track the performance of local government nances
(Bahl, 1999b).
7. BREACHES IN SEQUENCING: CAUSES AND RISKS
The primary question we raise in this paper is whether sequencing mat-
ters in developing and implementing a scal decentralization policy. Our
answer is that it does, and that mistakes in sequencing can lead to signi-
cant resource costs and possibly to a loss in condence in the decentraliza-
tion initiative.
We also raise two secondary questions in this paper. First, we ask
whether there is something akin to an optimal sequencing for decentral-
ization policies and implementation. Our answer is that there is, and that
following these sequencing rules might minimize the costs and the risks of
implementing scal decentralization. Second, we ask about the extent to
which countries follow these optimal sequencing rules. The answer would
appear to be that in general, they do not.
What to make of this gap between theory and practice? One might con-
sider a couple of conjectures. First, sequencing does not matter. Second,
there is a lack of information or there are institutional and political con-
straints. In this section, we address in more depth these two possibilities.
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7.1. Sequencing Does Not Matter?
One might argue that the order of introducing decentralization policy
does not matter, that sooner or later the structure of decentralization in
a country will end up at the same place no matter how one goes about
it. Look for example at the U.S., as strong an example of working scal
decentralization as there is. There was probably never a comprehensive
\white paper" on state and local government nance, yet the system grew
up to be quite functional. De facto, this is exactly the stance on sequencing
decentralization policies that seems to have been taken in many developing
countries.
The question is whether this is a wise strategy for developing countries,
most of which are in the early stages of decentralization. Certainly one
can understand the appeal. Decentralization policy is after all a political
decision, and the design and implementation of such a program will be
driven by bargaining and political timing. Even so, we would argue against
the \make it up as you go" strategy, for the following reasons:
First, it does not give the country leaders a chance to develop an end
strategy for decentralization, that is, it does not let them design a program
that will eventually achieve the objectives of the decentralization. If the
strategy is made up annually to respond to current problems, the decen-
tralization is not likely to end up as it would if a designed strategy were
followed. Is this a bad thing? One might argue that even if there were
a framework, it could be changed over time by new political leadership.
Moreover, a program that responds to current problems might not be a
bad strategy, i.e., oil the wheel that squeaks.
A problem with this approach is that it invites the prospects of being
driven exclusively by politics. Absent a policy frame, self-interested groups
might make amendments to specic policies that are not consistent with
the other pieces of the program that are already in place. The danger is
that over time, a system can lose focus.
An example of this danger is the Indian system of intergovernmental
transfers. Over time, the Finance Commission has concentrated primarily
on equalization transfers and on supporting a proper vertical share. The
Planning Commission has focused on capital grants, and mixed loan and
grant programs. The line Ministries have operated a plethora of condi-
tional grants, whose purposes and impacts are by now largely unknown.
Few would argue that the Indian system of intergovernmental transfers has
ended up \in the right place" to support scal decentralization.
Will a country's decentralization structure evolve to the same place no
matter how its introduction is sequenced? Not likely, we think. And if
one believes that decentralization is on the government's policy agenda
to achieve a specic set of objectives, one will conclude that sequencing
matters.
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The second reason is that even if one could eventually reach a \good"
decentralization structure by making policy decisions on an opportunistic
basis, there are considerable costs to be borne. Some of these are the costs
of the ineciencies introduced by unplanned (and perhaps unwise) interim
decisions that might be made as a result of political inuences.
Take the case of the U.S. and other decentralized industrial countries.
Many of them arrived at their current decentralization status after long
and tortuous histories of constitutional debate and other forms of politi-
cal friction and countless economic ineciencies and scal troubles. It is
unlikely that developing countries in the process of decentralization today
could aord to spend the time and the resources that it took many of these
industrialized countries to complete their decentralized systems. As is the
case for many policy issues, the example provided by many industrialized
countries as regards the sequencing of decentralization is one of how not to
do things.
Third, there is the cost of undoing a culture that is out of step with de-
centralization. For example, when countries adopt interim measures that
lead to soft budget constraints and near-total revenue reliance on transfers
from higher level governments, it creates a sense of dependency, and a feel-
ing that the nancing of government services is a function that \belongs"
to the higher level government. What makes matters worse is that both
central and subnational governments can come to accept this culture. As
many countries have learned, it is extremely hard to move away from the
culture of dependency.
7.2. Sequencing Matters
The alternative approach is the one we argue, that countries are better
o if they plan their decentralization policy and properly sequence its in-
troduction. There are a number of arguments to support this. From an
organizational viewpoint the rationale is based on two sets of arguments.
First, the transition costs or friction costs will be less under a planned
system, because the pieces of the decentralization policy are more likely to
t together, and because there may be less chance for policy or adminis-
trative mistakes to be made. Moreover there is less likelihood of having to
undo mistakes of the interim period. As noted above, these mistakes can
be very costly in terms of resources lost and in terms of a loss in condence
in the decentralization program.
Second, a proper ordering of decentralization allows government to keep
its eye on the future, and on the plan for the continued evolution of scal
decentralization. It is much better to tag reforms on to an existing frame-
work than to start o in new directions that may not t. And, it is much
better to anticipate implementation problems than to discover them in the
process of implementation. For example, under a planned development of
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decentralization, capacity development at the local government level might
begin early or be phased in under an asymmetric plan. Under the \make it
up as you go" approach, capacity development may be ignored for years and
then found wanting at the time policy points to granting more expenditure
responsibility to local governments.
In addition to facilitating the implementation of decentralization policy,
proper sequencing can also help avoid signicant costs that can otherwise
result ranging from inecient allocation of resources to macroeconomic
instability. Although it may not always be simple to disentangle the cause-
eect link between sequencing and other aspects of the decentralization
policy, the potential negative eects of poor sequencing can be, as we argue
below, quite serious. The potentially large costs of deviating from proper
sequencing beg the question of why countries do so.
7.3. Why Do Countries Deviate from Optimal Sequencing?
There are many possible reasons why so many countries appear to be
out of step with what we see to be the normative, textbook approach. Two
would seem especially noteworthy. First, the desirable sequence is complex
and too demanding in design. Fiscal planners in developing countries aren't
willing to take this on. Second, sequencing requires a sustained discipline
and vision for its implementation, and this requires overcoming pressures
from political actors.
In terms of design, governments may simply lack the information or
awareness of the desirability and convenience of the proper sequencing for
their decentralization policy. This is likely to be a powerful explanation.
In practice, policymakers appear to make more obvious and immediate
mistakes in scal decentralization design, such as providing negative incen-
tives to revenue mobilization in transfer systems, or decentralizing revenues
without having assigned expenditure functions to local governments. Thus,
it should not be surprising that they will not be knowledgeable or aware
of the more complex concept of proper sequencing. Little has been written
and less publicized on this issue in the academic and policy literatures on
scal decentralization.
Policymaking in real life, as opposed to a textbook scenario, is subject
to long lists of powerful, political and institutional constraints. One set of
political constraints has to do with special windows of opportunity for the
introduction of substantial reforms provided by changes in political regime
or the threat of such changes. It can be perfectly rational for policymakers
to take advantage of these windows of opportunity knowing that they are
shortchanging the process and that the outcome may be less than perfect
and that it will need \repairs" in the future. A related set of political con-
straints has to do with the average period governments are in power; for
example, a four year election cycle may not be long enough to see the re-
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sults of a decentralization reform, and therefore the temptation will arrive
to short-circuit the proper sequence. In general, one would expect coun-
tries with less stable political regimes to breach the desirable sequence for
decentralization more often than countries with more stable governments.
Numerous institutional constraints can bind governments to breach the
desirable sequencing of scal decentralization. Besides political costs in
coalition governments and relative administrative ease, policymakers may
be forced to balance tradeos involving existing administrative capacity,
regional equity issues, lack of accountability mechanisms at the local level,
and reform thrusts in other policy areas, such as tax policy or civil service.
7.4. Risks Associated with Sequencing Mistakes
Conceptually, one could attempt to quantify the potential risks associ-
ated with sequencing mistakes as being proportionate to the size of the
\contingent liability" associated with decentralization reform i.e., the rel-
ative share of scal resources being decentralized. This would become
a liability to the public sector if the reform is unsuccessful. As a rst,
rough approximation, we might think about quantifying the expected risk
as the product of this liability and the likelihood or probability of failure
implied by the particular sequencing misstep. As such, scal decentraliza-
tion reforms that involve fewer budgetary resources, or minor taxes and no
borrowing authority (rather than major expenditure responsibilities, ma-
jor taxes, and borrowing powers) are scally less risky. Proposed reforms
that have major obstacles in implementation (e.g., reforms that require
signicant reform of regulatory processes and procedures) have a higher
probability of failure resulting in potentially greater scal risks.
Of course, one way to minimize the risks associated with scal decen-
tralization is to reduce its scope. Think small. But in doing so the country
forgoes large potential benets also associated with decentralization. Some
analysts, and politicians, might see another way to minimize risks as to de-
sign and implement only small parts of the program and take a piecemeal
approach to decentralization. But if the full system is not designed, the
pieces may not t together in this process and the costs (risks) go up.
Clearly, there is a tradeo between risks and benets of decentralization
and where a particular country lands on that line will depend on how
risk averse government feels it needs to be. In the aftermath of Suharto,
Indonesia was in a position where the introduction of scal decentralization
had become a much less risky proposition than in the past, so a big bang
approach became politically feasible. India's state decits may be forcing
more risky approaches to scal decentralization. But Russia seems to be
moving in the direction of recentralizing and minimizing risks.
A quantication of the general risks associated with sequencing mistakes
will not be attempted here. We focus instead on qualitative assessment
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of the risks associated with the common missteps or deviations from our
normative blueprint for sequencing. For example, what are the risks of a
program that is implemented before it is fully designed, as in Indonesia's
big bang? What are the consequences of xing revenue entitlements before
xing expenditure responsibilities (Brazil) or giving subnational govern-
ments borrowing authority without imposing a hard budget constraint on
them (India)?
In oering policy advice to countries about sequencing issues, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between what is a high risk mistake versus what is lower
risk mistake. The two classes of risks associated with dierent sequencing
mistakes are outlined below.
7.4.1. High-Risk Sequencing Choices
Mistakes in sequencing can impose serious costs on society, as noted
above. However, not all missteps will have similarly signicant conse-
quences. The costs of a poorly sequenced decentralization program can
range from ineectiveness and subsequent failing support of decentraliza-
tion eorts, to macroeconomic instability and even chaotic situations and
fundamental failure in public sector delivery, to minor delays and confusion
about responsibilities. The specic consequences of a particular misstep
in the sequencing design of decentralization reform are particular to each
country. Still, some general principles about these risks, and about the cost
of recovering from sequencing mistakes, can be enumerated.
Failing to develop a comprehensive policy document that denes a frame-
work for the scal decentralization. This is perhaps the most controversial
of sequencing rules, probably because so much political capital must be
used up in making the overall plan transparent. But most hard policy de-
cisions are politically dicult, and the view here is that the consequences
and costs of not taking on this risk at an early stage are quite signicant.
If the overall framework is not developed, the decentralization law will
lack a foundation, implementation will lead policy, the decentralization s-
trategy will drift and lose focus, and it will not likely achieve the objectives
that have been set for it. There will be resource costs associated with
retting the program because some of the policy pieces have failed. More-
over, the time cost of piecemeal design can be signicant, e.g., years of
equalization in local government capacity development might be lost.
Failing to install a hard budget constraint on subnational governments.
By creating a culture of dependency, the government creates a long ter-
m problem with scal discipline, and one that is dicult to deal with as
time goes on. Local ocials, especially elected local ocials with short
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time horizons, much prefer to nance expenditures with grants from high-
er level governments than to raise taxes, and much prefer borrowing vs.
nancing services with current revenues. At the extreme, the absence of
a hard budget constraint together with a delinking of borrowing from the
creditworthiness criteria can invite serious macroeconomic stability prob-
lems.
Getting the \nance follows function" rule out of order. Not developing
a clear set of expenditure assignments before developing revenue assign-
ment and a vertical share of transfers is a mistake that continues to plague
decentralization programs. This leads to ineciencies in service delivery,
unwanted scal disparities and is an enemy of the hard budget constraint.
In some cases, it will lead to central decits and macroeconomic instability.
This is the most common of the sequencing mistakes. It is the rare decen-
tralization program around the world that does not feel constrained by an
unclear or inappropriate expenditure assignment. As problematic a situa-
tion is to reassign expenditure responsibilities to subnational governments
or impose (unfunded) mandates without assigning appropriate revenues to
nance these new functions.
Passing the decentralization law, or placing decentralization provisions in
the Constitution, before developing the objectives and framework, i.e., the
plan for decentralization. This can carry great consequences, especially if
constitutional provisions get out in front of a clearly thought out set of goal-
s for the decentralization. The consequence of this misstep in sequencing
can be an intergovernmental structure that encourages scal indiscipline,
an assignment of revenues and expenditures that do not match and cannot
easily be changed, and an inexible system that is outgrown by the econo-
my. The costs may be the instability that comes with scal decits at the
subnational government level, service levels that are made more inadequate
by the mismatch between resources and expenditure responsibilities, and
unwanted scal disparities.
Failing to develop a clear set of implementing regulations, based on the
decentralization law and done prior to implementation, creates a variety of
signicant problems including, various levels of government choosing the
method of implementing the decentralization that best suits their interests,
to costly use of resources, and to ineciency in service delivery.
Failing to put in place a capacity development program for subnational
governments. A best route is to begin preparing local governments for their
new responsibilities as soon as possible in the process of decentralization.
The longer one waits to begin this process, the longer the time before local
governments can assume new responsibilities for scal leadership. The lack
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of capacity development can lead to incomplete decentralization programs,
for example, those that stall at the intermediate level of government and
never reach the local level.
7.4.2. Lower Risk Sequencing Mistakes
Certain other deviations from an optimal ordering of decentralization
policy and implementation impose costs, but are lower risk in that they
can be more easily corrected.
Moving forward with decentralization without a deconcentrated system
of service delivery in place. As noted above, deconcentration quite likely
makes it easier to decentralize service delivery responsibility to subnational
governments but it is not an absolutely necessary intermediate step. Local
government capacity can be developed independent of deconcentration.
Another concern is that eective deconcentration might crowd out de-
centralization, by reducing the demand for local control. This might not
be a risk. Deconcentration may seek local inputs in deciding, for exam-
ple, on investment allocations, but central ocials operating in the local
area are still accountable upward to higher level governments rather than
downward to voters. Deconcentration would seem a weak substitute for
decentralization.
Failing to provide subnational governments with signicant revenue-raising
autonomy. It is the rare developing country that assigns signicant tax-
ing powers to subnational governments at the onset of decentralization.
Getting buy-in on this from the central government, and getting prop-
er capacity developed at the subnational level are stumbling blocks that
would seem no more severe many years into a decentralization program
that at the outset. However, a culture of dependency does take hold, and
subnational governments do become accustomed to an intergovernmental
system where they rely on central transfers. The accountability that comes
with local revenue raising is lost and is another component of this culture
of dependency. The better route is to lay out the plan for local govern-
ment nancing as part of the general strategy for decentralization. That
is perhaps the one time that all of the possible options can be placed on
the table. The costs arising from the lack of revenue autonomy are likely
to increase over time.
Failing to provide borrowing powers to subnational governments. Clearly
it is desirable to set up a regime for creditworthy subnational governments
to nance capital facilities with debt. If the borrowing program is not set
up at the outset, this raises some eciency costs that might have been
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avoided (e.g., under-nancing long lived assets from current account rev-
enues). But the later introduction of borrowing powers is a sequencing
mistake of lesser order. The introduction of borrowing powers without a
hard budget constraint, as noted above, is a sequencing mistake of a major
order.
Lacking a national debate to gain consensus about decentralization poli-
cy. Obviously, consensus is important, and support for a program can be
developed by allowing a broad range of inputs. But in fact, many countries
do not have such a national debate, unless it is forced. The absence of a
national consensus may endanger the sustainability of scal decentraliza-
tion.
Failing to establish a monitoring and evaluation system. It is important
to set this up at the outset so that the decentralization program can be
monitored and evaluated, and possibly ne-tuned with policy adjustments.
However, it can be set up at a later point in the process, and this is in
fact the case in many countries. The costs implied are the failure to catch
problems in the early stages, and the limited information that is available
to politicians as they make changes in the system.
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